The Administration of the Property of a Deceased Partner by Wheelon, Burton J.
Washington Law Review 
Volume 1 Number 1 
6-1-1925 
The Administration of the Property of a Deceased Partner 
Burton J. Wheelon 





 Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Burton J. Wheelon, Notes and Comments, The Administration of the Property of a Deceased Partner, 1 
Wash. L. Rev. 57 (1925). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol1/iss1/6 
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law 
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law 
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
NOTES AND COMMENT
THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE PROPERTY OF A DECEASED
PARTNER-The descent of property to heirs or devisees is a right
conferred by society and the statutes governing administration and
distribution must, as a general rule, be strictly complied with. The
case of the administration of a deceased member of a partnership,
however, deals with property which does not belong to the deceased
alone, but in which the surviving partners have a common and often
equal or superior interest. Furthermore, the obligations incurred by
the firm, through its members, bind the members jointly, it being
remembered that a partnership is not an entity in the eyes of the
law, but a mere aggregation of individuals. Because of this liability
of the surviving partners for all of the firm debts, it was held as a
matter of right, at common law, that the surviving partners suc-
ceeded to the absolute control of partnership property upon the
death of one of the partners.1 It followed, then, that the partnership
property of the deceased did not come within the control of the
executor or administrator of the deceased's estate, and since he
therefore was possessed of no funds with which to meet firm obliga-
tions, the remedy of the creditors of the firm was confined to actions
against its surviving members.2 That being true, it was not necessary
that such creditors file their claims with the general administrator
of the deceased's estate. Nor need they file them with the surviving
partner, for he is presumed to be familiar with all the details of the
business, including knowledge as to who are its creditors.
The question we meet, then, is: How far do our statutes on this
subject supersede or displace the common law?
Our first statute was passed in 1862 and provided 3 that the per-
sonal representatives of deceased should have the right to have some-
one other than a surviving partner wind up the affairs of the firm,
or to have such survivor give proper security There was no pro-
vision in the statute authorizing the surviving partner himself to
set in motion the machinery provided therein, and for that reason
our Supreme Court, in the noted case of Dyer v. Morse4 held that
the statute was not exclusive of the common law, but only in aid
thereof; that the legislature did not intend to hold the surviving
partners (who are still jointly liable for the satisfaction of firm
obligations) liable to satisfy firm debts out of their own funds,
without recourse to the firm property of the deceased unless his per-
sonal representatives invoked the aid of the statute.
By a statute passed in 18695 the liability of a joint debtor was
made to survive against his personal representatives, thus doing away
1Barlow & Shepherd v. Coggan, 1 Wash. Ter. 258; Brigham-Hop-
kins Co. v. Gross, 20 Wash. 218, 54 Pac. 1127.
2 Barlow & Shepherd v. Coggan, supra.
3 L. '62-'63 pp. 225 et seq.
4 10 Wash. 492, 39 Pac. 138, 28 L. R. A. 89.
5 L. '69 P. 165, see. 659, Rem. Comp. Stat. sec. 967" Donnerberg v.
Oppenheimer, 15 Wash. 290, 46 Pac. 254; Olson v. Seldovia Salmon
Co., 89 Wash. 547, 154 Pac. 1107.
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with the common-law doctrine that the sole remedy was against the
surviving debtor, and thus giving a creditor of a partnership a right
of action against the estate of a deceased partner, in the event of the
partnership's assets being insufficient to meet its liabilities.
The act of 1862 was superseded by the act of 18736 which was
similar to our present statute passed in 1917 By these subsequent
acts, the surviving partner may invoke the operation of the ma-
chinery therein provided, as will shortly be seen. It was therefore
held in Brigham-Hopkins Co. v. Gross' that since the statute takes
away from the surviving partner the unqualified right to administer
the partnership estate, the reason for sustaining an action against
such survivor no longer exists, unless the firm estate be insolvent.
Therefore, an action at law could not be maintained against the
survivors, pending settlement of the partnership estate, on debts due
from the firm. This for the reason that ordinarily partnership assets
should first be subjected to payment of partnership debts, before the
individual property of a partner is subjected thereto. Of course the
surviving partners are liable individually for any deficiency, and it
was held in the same case upon a subsequent appeal7 that a firm
creditor could maintain an action against the surviving partners,
after the settlement of the partnership estate, when firm assets were
insufficient to pay all the firm debts. The common law is changed
then, only to the extent that the remedy of creditors is postponed
pending settlement of the estate, and running of the statute of
limitations is suspended during such period.
State ex rel Keasel v. Superior Court of Pierce County 8 over-
ruling the case of In re Alfstad's Estate,9 held that the probate court,
being a court of original jurisdiction, and being clothed with power
to settle partnership estates, is necessarily competent to determine
the question of the existence of a partnership, when such existence is
not conceded and when such determination is necessary before there
can be a proper administration of the estate.
The statutes now covering this subject' ° read as follows:
"The whole of the partnership property shall be administered by
such executor or administrator, unless the surviving partner shall
within five days from the filing of the inventory, or such further time
as the court may allow, apply for the administration thereof.1 ' If he
so apply he shall be entitled to administer the partnership property
if the court find him to be qualified. If letters of administration be
issued to such partner, he shall give such bond as the court may re-
6 L. '73 pp. 276 et seq.
730 Wash. 277, 70 Pac. 480.
8 76 Wash. 291, 136 Pac. 147.
9 27 Wash. 175, 67 Pac. 593.
10 Rem. Comp. Stat. secs. 1458 to 1461, inc.
11 Applied in Simon v. Levy 114 Wash 556, 195 Pac. 1025, State ex
rel Simon v Superior Court, 117 Wash. 376, 201 Pac. 25 and the same,
120 Wash. 398, 207 Pac. 960.
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quire. He shall be denominated the administrator of the partnership
and shall give such notice to the partnership creditors as general
administrators are required to give and shall settle the partnership
estate in the same manner as is or shall be provided for the settlement
of estates of deceased persons except he shall account to the general
executor or administrator for the interest of the deceased in the
partnership property."
Section 1459 provides for the purchase by the surviving partner,
if he wishes to, of the interest of the deceased in any or all of the
personal property of the partnership. Under Sec. 1460 the court
may authorize the administrator of the partnership to continue oper-
ation of the business pending settlement of the estate or purchase by
the survivor. And if a surviving partner is not appointed administra-
tor of the partnership property, then under Sec. 1461 administration
thereof shall devolve upon the general executor or administrator, to
whom the court may compel the surviving partner to deliver the firm
property.
Whether a surviving partner may purchase the firm real estate
is not decided, unless inferentially. Of course, firm realty stands in
the name of one or more of the members of the firm and legal title
thereto therefore descends to the heirs of the partner dying so pos-
sessed. But such heirs take in trust for the firm and subject to the
debts of the firm, and the survivors can get the legal title only by
deed from such heirs or by application to a court of equity. 2 But
it was held in the case of State ex rel Bogey v. Neal,'3 that in equity,
partnership real estate will be considered as personalty so far as
payment of debts and the adjustment of partnership rights are con-
cerned, and for those purposes, sale of firm realty could be made un-
der the rules governing sales of personalty.
It was held in State ex rel Keasel v. Superior Court, supra, that
the surviving partner need not wait until the inventory has been
filed by the general executor before the surviving partner may apply
for letters, the statute intending only to fix the limit beyond which
application may not be made unless extension of time be granted.
There remain to be discussed one or two points touching the
rights of creditors upon the death of a member of a partnership. The
affairs of the firm may be of such a nature that it require a year or
more to wind them up. Having filed claims against the partnership
estate, as by statute required,14 how may a creditor safeguard his
right to hold the separate estate of the deceased partner, in the event
of the partnership's assets being insufficient? The answer, according
to a Montana decision,15 seems to be that "a contingent claim" must
be filed in the deceased partner's estate along with the filing of the
12 Hannegan v. Roth, 12 Wash. 65, 40 Pac. 636.
13 29 Wash. 391, 69 Pac. 1103.
14 Rem. Comp. Stat. see. 1458 provides for administration "in the
same manner as is provided for the settlement of the estates of
deceased persons" which requires that all claims be filed within six
months. (Rem. Comp. Stat. sec. 1477.)
15Mares v. Mares (Mont), 199 Pac. 267.
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claims in the partnership administration proceedings, or at least with-
in the permitted six months. Although I am unable to find that
Washington has passed expressly upon this point, yet it is clearly
inferrable from the cases of Andrews v. Kelleher and Barto v.
Stewart,16 that contingent claims not only may be filed, but must be
filed, within the six months, or the claim is barred.
But under the doctrine of joint liability does a creditor waive his
right to move against the surviving partner if he files a claim against
the deceased member's estate? There is no ready answer to this
question and it has not been passed upon by our supreme court. We
do know, however, that he must so file to protect his claim that he
must abide the accounting in the partnership estate, and that if he
moves against either of the joint debtors he releases the other.
It seems reasonable to consider that the mere filing of his claim is not
an action against one of the joint debtors, but only a preservation
of a possible right of action, and that it is no bar to his election, at
the proper time, as to which of the joint debtors he will seek to hold.
And if such creditor would seek to hold all the joint debtors his
method of procedure is prescribed in Rem. Comp. Stat. sec. 236.
Burton J. Wheelon.
16 Andrews v. Kelleher, 124 Wash. 517, 214 Pac. 1056, Barto v. Stew-
art, 21 Wash. 605, 59 Pac. 480. The Andrews case was one where the
testator had, in his lifetime, guaranteed certain bonds. It happened
that the first of those bonds would not mature until after the statutory
time for filing claims in the deceased's estate would have expired.
The court reached the conclusion above intimated, since Rem. Comp.
Stat. secs. 1547, 1548 and 1549 impliedly recognized the validity of
contingent claims. These sections appear in the division of the pro-
bate code relating to accounts of executors and payment of debts.
They provide, in general, for the withholding from distribution of suffi-
cient funds of the estate to cover "contingent or disputed" claims.
Incidentally the Andrews case is authority for the proposition that
a contingent claim need not be verified as "justly due," as see. 1478
Rem. Comp. Stat. provides, for in such case it is impossible to truth-
fully follow the wording of the Statute.
In the Barto case, the testator was a stockholder in a bank which
became insolvent, and his liability on his stock was ultimately de-
termined to be nearly $4,000. Meanwhile he had died and the time
had elapsed for presentation of claims. To an action against the
testator's executors by the liquidation of said bank, defendants pleaded
the statute of limitations. The plaintiff argued that this was not a
claim within the meaning of the statute; that the statute referred only
to legal demands and was not intended to apply to a liability of a
purely equitable nature, which the liquidator must go into equity to
enforce; that while the statute was running, the claim was an uncer-
tainty and the presentation of a claim in such case would be an idle
ceremony which the law will not require. It was also argued that the
affidavit to the claim would not be made as the statute required.
Nevertheless recovery was denied because of the failure to present
a claim, even though contingent, in the decedent's state, before the
statute had run. Hence the conclusion that a creditor's or a surviving
partner's claim against the separate property of deceased would be
barred unless filed in his estate, even though the actual winding up
of the partnership estate may long exceed the running of the statute.
